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Security9 min read|

November 21, 2026

How to Request Files Securely With Upload Links

How to request files securely from clients with upload links: the real risks, expiry, passwords, email codes, scoping, and checks to run after the upload.

How to Request Files Securely With Upload Links

Your accounts team needs signed contracts, scanned IDs and a year of bank statements from a new client. The client has no SFTP client, no SSH key and no patience for either. So the files arrive as email attachments, a consumer cloud share link, or a ZIP on a USB stick handed over at reception. If you want to request files securely from people who will never become regular SFTP users, an upload link is usually the right tool, as long as you set it up with the same care you would give any other inbound channel.

This post covers what can go wrong with upload links, which controls actually reduce risk, a checklist for creating one, and what to do with the files after they land.

Why email and ad-hoc shares fail

Email feels secure because it is familiar, not because it is. The problems are well known:

  • Size limits - Most mail servers reject attachments over 20 to 25 MB, so large files get split, compressed or moved to whatever share service the sender happens to use.
  • Copies everywhere - An attachment lives in the sender's outbox, every recipient's inbox, every backup of those mailboxes, and often a forwarded thread you never see.
  • No expiry - Files sent by email stay readable for as long as the mailbox exists. Nobody goes back to delete a contract scan from 2023.
  • No audit trail you control - You cannot easily prove who received what, when, or whether it was downloaded again later.
  • Shadow sharing - When email bounces, people fall back to personal cloud accounts. Now sensitive files sit in a tenant your organization does not manage.

For a recurring, automated exchange with a business partner, the answer is an SFTP account with key-based authentication (see the partner onboarding guide). For a one-off or occasional request from a person with a browser, that is overkill. An upload link fills the gap.

The threat model for upload links

An upload link is a bearer credential. Anyone who holds the URL can use it, unless you add a second factor. That single fact drives most of the risks:

  • Link leakage - The URL gets forwarded, pasted into a ticket, stored in browser history or captured by a mail gateway that logs every link in every message.
  • Link preview bots - Chat tools and email security scanners fetch URLs to generate previews or check for phishing. On a share link with a download limit, a bot can use up a download before the real recipient clicks.
  • Guessable or enumerable links - Short or sequential identifiers let an attacker try URLs until one works. A link token should be long and random, not /upload/1043.
  • Over-broad access - An "upload" link that also lists or serves the folder's existing contents turns one client's link into a window onto every other client's files.
  • Unwanted content - Anyone with the link can upload anything: wrong files, huge files, or malicious documents aimed at whoever opens them first.
  • Long-lived links - A link created for a two-day request that still works a year later is an open inbox nobody is watching.

Notice what is not on the list: interception in transit. Upload links run over HTTPS, so the transport is the easy part. The risk sits in who can use the link and what happens to the files afterwards.

Controls that matter when you request files securely

Not every control is equally useful. In rough order of impact:

Required expiry

Every link should expire, and the expiry should match the request. A tax document request might need a week. A "send us the logs" request during an incident might need four hours. If your tool lets you create links without an expiry, it will eventually be full of links without an expiry.

A second factor: password or one-time email code

A password turns the link from "anyone with the URL" into "anyone with the URL and the password". It only helps if you send the password through a different channel, such as a phone call, SMS or a message in your client portal. A password in the same email as the link adds nothing.

A one-time email code is often better for external people. The recipient enters their email address, receives a short-lived code, and only then sees the upload page. That ties each use of the link to a mailbox, which is both a security control and an audit record of who actually uploaded.

Scope: one request, one destination

Create a separate link and a separate destination folder for each request or each client. Upload links should be write-only: the person uploading should not see other files in the folder, and certainly not files from other requests. Separate folders also make cleanup trivial when the request is closed.

Limits on share links

The same controls apply in the other direction, when you send files out. A download limit caps how many times a share link can be used. Combined with a short expiry, it limits the damage if the link is forwarded. Keep the link preview bot problem in mind: if your recipients use tools that unfurl links, set the limit to two or three rather than one, or rely on email codes instead.

An audit trail

Record link creation, every upload and download, the email address that passed verification, and link revocation. When a client says "I uploaded it on Tuesday", you want to answer from a log, not from someone's memory. The audit logging guide covers what a useful file transfer audit log contains.

A practical checklist for each request

Use this as a template whenever someone on your team asks an outside party for files:

  1. Decide the channel - One-off or occasional request from a person: upload link. Recurring machine-to-machine transfer: SFTP account with an SSH key.
  2. Create a dedicated destination - One folder per client or per request, named so you can find it later (for example clients/acme/2026-11-kyc).
  3. Set the expiry first - Pick the shortest window that still lets the client respond. Extending a link is easier than explaining why an old one still works.
  4. Add a second factor - Turn on one-time email codes, or set a password and share it out of band.
  5. Tell the recipient what to send - List the expected files, formats and names. "Please upload a PDF of the signed contract and your last three statements as PDF" prevents half the clean-up work.
  6. Send the link from a known address - Clients are trained to distrust unexpected links. Send it from the person they already deal with, and mention it on a call if the files are sensitive.
  7. Revoke when done - When the files have arrived, disable the link even if it has not expired yet.
  8. Move files out of the drop zone - Process, archive or delete the uploaded files according to your retention policy. A drop folder is not long-term storage.

What to check after the upload

An upload link controls who can send files. It does not tell you whether the files are what you asked for. Treat everything that arrives as untrusted until it passes a few checks. A minimal script you can run on a downloaded batch:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage: ./check-uploads.sh ./incoming
set -euo pipefail

dir="$1"
max_bytes=$((50 * 1024 * 1024))   # 50 MB
allowed="application/pdf image/jpeg image/png"

for f in "$dir"/*; do
  [ -f "$f" ] || continue
  size=$(wc -c < "$f")
  mime=$(file --brief --mime-type "$f")

  if [ "$size" -gt "$max_bytes" ]; then
    echo "REJECT size  $f ($size bytes)"
  elif [[ " $allowed " != *" $mime "* ]]; then
    echo "REJECT type  $f ($mime)"
  else
    echo "OK           $f ($mime, $size bytes)"
    sha256sum "$f" >> "$dir/manifest.sha256"
  fi
done

A few notes on what this does and does not do:

  • Check the real type, not the extension - file --mime-type reads the file's magic bytes, so invoice.pdf.exe renamed to invoice.pdf will not pass as a PDF.
  • Record a hash on arrival - The SHA-256 manifest lets you prove later that the file you processed is the file the client uploaded. The file integrity guide goes deeper on checksums.
  • Scan for malware separately - Type and size checks do not detect a malicious PDF or macro-enabled document. Run uploads through your endpoint protection or a scanner such as ClamAV (clamscan -r ./incoming) before anyone opens them, especially files from people you have never dealt with before.

Common pitfalls

  • Password in the same email as the link - It looks like two factors and is one.
  • One permanent link per client - Convenient, and indistinguishable from an always-open inbox. Create links per request.
  • Download limit of one with link-unfurling recipients - The preview bot wins and the client gets an "expired" page. Use email codes or a slightly higher limit.
  • Reusing the drop folder as the archive - Files pile up, retention rules are never applied, and the folder becomes the most sensitive place in your storage.
  • Opening uploads straight from the browser - Download, check and scan first. Upload links accept files from the outside world by design.
  • Using links for automated feeds - If a partner uploads every night, give them an SFTP account with a key instead. Links are for people, not cron jobs.

How FilePulse fits

FilePulse is a fully managed file transfer service hosted in the EU, and its Filedrop feature covers both directions described here. Upload links and share links always have an expiry, and you can add a password, require one-time email codes, and set download limits on share links. Activity is recorded in a tamper-evident, SHA-256 hash-chained audit log with signed checkpoints, and webhook or email notifications can tell your team when something needs attention. For partners who send files on a schedule, the same account offers SFTP with public-key authentication, FTPS and an API, so occasional and automated senders end up in one place. FilePulse does not include malware scanning, so keep a scanning step in your own process before files are opened.

Next step: Start a 14-day free trial of FilePulse, no credit card required, and send your next client document request as an expiring upload link with email verification.